


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### THE DEVELOPMENT OF MAO TSE-TUNG'S LINE

Chang Lu-ting (張魯庭) chairman of the CCP Central Committee Propaganda department has said; "The CCP is always a progressive party, but in the process of getting experience the leaders have made many mistakes. These mistakes have been very costly and have forewarned us to avoid them in the future. At the time of the Great Revolution [1926-1927] we had 50,000 party members. After Chiang Kai-shek deserted the revolution and carried out his purge there were 10,000 members. During the period of the Kiangsi Soviet, party membership rose again to 300,000; after the great trek it dropped to 40,000. We had 300,000 fighting men during the civil war period [1929-1937]; after the great trek they dropped to 40,000. All of these vicissitudes occurred before the rise of Mao Tse-tung and arose from the errors of our leaders.

At present we have 2,200,000 party members and 1,500,000 regular troops and 4 million armed peasantry.

During the first six years of the history of the CCP, Ch'en Tu-hsiu (陳獨秀) was the recognized leader. Ch'en, a Peiping educator, was one of the founders of the CCP. At the first national conference of the CCP in 1921 there were just twelve delegates, and there were only a few tens of members throughout the country. In 1923, at the urging of Sun Chung-san [Sun Yat-sen], the CCP joined the KMT, while at the same time preserving its own

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organization. The particular function of the CCP was to organize the workers and peasants. By 1925 there were 15,000 party members.

As the CCP looks at things now Ch'en's error was in yielding to the capitalists and Chiang. While the United KMT-CCP armies were still in Canton, before they started their bid for power throughout the country, Chiang had begun his opposition to the CCP. In March 1926 he placed a naval commander under arrest because he was a CCP member, and issued an order that all high naval commanders and political workers who were CCP members were to be dismissed. Today CCP members recognize that the CCP should have taken a stand at that juncture.

At that time the CCP had rendered great aid to the KMT in organizing armed forces, and three of the four armies in Canton were under CCP influence and in the fourth army there were CCP sympathizers. A great many CCP members desired to oppose Chiang's purge, but Ch'en yielded to Chiang. Ch'en yielded again in the 5 May propositions of the KMT which removed CCP members from the KMT Central Committee and a number of leadership posts in KMT organizations, in spite of the fact that many of these KMT organizations had been started by CCP men.

Mr. Lu further says, "This policy prevented the CCP members from preparing to oppose Chiang's anti-revolutionary activities which began with the massacre of workers in Shanghai in April 1927. But in Wuhan there was still an opportunity. Right through the summer of 1927 a majority of the officials in Wuhan were KMT

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Central Committee Members who were cooperating with the CCP, but Ch'en would not defect [from the KMT]. He permitted the disarming of the inspectors at Wuhan, and opposed the land reform though the emergence of these matters was in opposition to his hopes.

When the military party seized power at Ch'ang-sha 100,000 armed peasants surrounded the city and all plans were made to recover the city at the word from Wuhan. However the KMT Central Committee members in the government at Wuhan were mortally frightened - ~~led~~ at this demonstration of the people's power and at their demand the CCP Central Committee issued orders for the dispersal of the peasant forces. This retreat by the CCP cost them leadership of the peasants and made possible the anti-revolutionary camp in Wuhan in July.

The CCP at present recognizes another error, the failure to hold firm and organize a base around Nan-ch'ang at the time of the 1 August uprising. Inexperience resulted in failure to recognize the possibilities and led a nostalgic trek toward the old home base in Kwangtung, resulting in their forces being scattered at Siatow. When Chu-te joined up with Mao Tse-tung in Hunan they had not more than a thousand followers.

After the debacle at Wuhan Ch'en's followers were gradually displaced by others. Today the party recognizes that after Chen's mistake, the ~~mi~~take was made of going too far left resulting in three fundamental errors.

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The first which developed after November 1927 and was corrected by April 1928 consisted in a confused mingling of people's democratic reform and socialistic reform resulting in an ultra-leftist movement based on the idea that the nature of the Chinese revolutions required a constant revolution, and a refusal to acknowledge the failure of the "great revolution". It was manifested in the stirring up of a great many hopeless sporadic uprisings. However, the December 1927 uprising in Canton is still regarded as having had results in that it raised a banner for all to follow and produced the first general proclamation of the CCP program to the people of the whole country.

In June 1930 the leftists again gained control of the CCP, and, thinking to take advantage of the fact that the KMT militarists were at war with one another <sup>IN</sup> Yen Hsi-shan and Feng Yu-hsiang's nearly successful revolt against the Nanking government<sup>7</sup>, looked with disdain upon Mao and Chen's country movement, and decided to seize a number of big cities as bases.

About five months after their failure, in January 1931 the leadership of the CCP fell into the hands of a group of Marxist - Leninist - Stalinist doctrinaires who knew less about actual Chinese conditions than any of the leftists that had preceeded them. ~~They felt that the second leftists that had preceeded them.~~ They felt that the second leftist movement had failed only because it was insufficiently leftist and they called for a "pure proletarian line." Wearing Marxist-Leninist theory as an outer garb they succeeded in carrying out their ideas for four years until the Kweichow conference during the great trek brought a change.

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Lu Ting-i says, "The leadership of the doctrinaires resulted in great loss to us. When we were in Kiangsi, leaders in Fukien who were opposing the subservience of Chiang to the Japanese offered to form a common front with us. However the doctrinaires would have no truck with the Fukien capitalists and thereby lost us an opportunity for victory."

While the CCP recognizes today that with proper policy in *would have been avoidable, they are not willing to say that the great trek* Kiangsi the great trek was a mistake. It was during the great trek that the party changed leadership, and Mao Tse-tung's leadership resulted in the great trek becoming a great victory which to a large extent determined the future development of the movement. Although Yunan was in a backward area which made expansion difficult at first, and Kiangsi as a base with Foochow as a port might have been a more advantageous situation, no one in the party today bothers to discuss those possibilities.

One result of the third attempt at leftist leadership was the reduction of CCP party members from 300,000 to the 40,000 *leftist* at the end of the great trek.

The Mao Tse-tung line is a weapon forged and furnished in the welter of conflicts.

He was the leader of the Hunan Peasant parisans ordered by Ch'en to disband in 1927. Later he united his remnant peasant self-defense forces with Chu-te's defeated troops to become the leader of the CCP moderates in the Kiangsu Soviet. However the real power at that time was in the hands of the doctrinaires.

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What did Mao Tse-tung know at that time beyond the life of the peasantry?

The present successes of the CCP have grown out of the theories of Mao enunciated back in those early days. While the doctrinaires were shouting for the occupation of city bases Mao believed that the Chinese Soviet government could best be developed in the Mountain bases of central China in the provincial border areas.

In this idea Mao departed from the European pattern [of revolution] to adopt a pattern adapted to Chinese conditions. In Europe the frontiers are all heavily guarded, but in China the strength of the militarists was in the provincial capital cities. The provincial borders farthest from the cities were the least guarded and here the peasant self-defense corps could be developed into a strong force. The Mao Chu Combination of leadership brought into mutually helpful play Mao's keen insight joined to Chu's military knowledge. With this combination the CCP passed through the Japanese war and 18 years of Chiang Kai-shek's opposition.

The important point of their strategy was recognition that the enemy was stronger than they. If they tried to withstand a frontal attack and were defeated they would lose; if they drove the enemy back only slightly that could not be counted a victory. Their formula for victory was to surround the enemy and capture weapons and personnel. When the enemy came they would let them have any city they wanted and retire into hiding, securing intelligence, meanwhile, from the peasants. Only when conditions were very favorable would

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they accept battle and then only very briefly and only with certainty of victory. When the enemy's strength had wasted away by attrition they would attack; but with great caution, to recover cities and villages.

This form of strategy is no different from the traditional form that foreign military experts are inclined to term it guerrilla warfare but the term is hardly suitable to the case in Shantung in January 1947 when 3½ brigades of Chiang's crack troops were surrounded, 7,000 killed and 20,000 captured with their weapons.

The CCP strategists make a clear distinction between their guerrilla forces and their regulars. While on occasion their regular troops may be split into small groups they remain very active and well-disciplined and can re-assemble on short notice. This type of strategy can be used for self-defense only in areas where the military has the full confidence and support of the people, it is not suitable for aggressive warfare, it is advantageous for the people where a strong outside force is attacking a colonial area.

Mao came to real leadership during the great trek (which would have failed without his leadership). This is universally acknowledged by CCP members today. However it was not until the seventh plenary session of CCP delegates that he was formally elected as Chairman. At that time the party had expanded its membership under his defacto leadership to 1,200,000. This seventh session is

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spoken of as the victorious all-China unification session, when those who had been struggling on many different fronts were able to adopt a universal plan. In that conference it was recognized that all the other leaders who had made mistakes would have been likely to have been thrust out had not Mao saved them by proclaiming that any one who was truly sorrowful for his past mistakes, however great, was more valuable as a leader than those who had not been proven in trial.

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